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Death Penalty Law

by Therese M. Day*
This Article provides a survey of death penalty case law in Georgia
from June 1, 2005 through May 31, 2006. The cases include those that
the Georgia Supreme Court heard on interim appeal, direct appeal, and
on review of habeas corpus decisions. Two recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court are also included because of their relevance to
Georgia death penalty law. While there have been recent significant
statutory changes affecting capital litigation in Georgia, those changes
are beyond the purview of this Article and therefore will not be
discussed. Likewise, holdings in capital cases that are common to all
criminal appeals will not be discussed in this Article.
I.

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

A.

Interim Review Case
In Miley v. State,1 James Miley was indicted for murder and other
crimes, and the State filed a notice of its intent to seek the death
penalty.2 The court granted Miley's application for interim appellate
review to address the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying
Miley's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of Miley's
home.'
According to the record, Miley was questioned at the station house in
connection with the death of Ashley Neves. One of the detectives asked
Miley to accompany him to Miley's home to retrieve a book bag that a
witness had seen Miley wearing near the crime scene. Miley agreed to
retrieve the book bag with the detective but refused to sign a written
consent. Because the detective did not want to proceed without written
* Staff Attorney, Office of the Georgia Capital Defender, Atlanta, Georgia. San
Francisco State University (B.A., 1993); University of Arizona College of Law (J.D., 2002).
1. 279 Ga. 420, 614 S.E.2d 744 (2005).
2. Id. at 420, 614 S.E.2d at 744.
3. Id. at 420-21, 614 S.E.2d at 744.
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consent, he prepared an affidavit and presented it to a magistrate who
issued a warrant to search Miley's home.'
The affidavit stated the following:
James Christopher Miley ws [sic] identified as the person who wa [sic]
last seen with the victim on 5-20-00, at the place of her death. The
person who killed the victim, Ashley Nicole Neeves [sic], removed some
of her clothing from the scene. When I asked the subject, Mr. Miley[,]
to sign a consent form so I could enter his house and retrieve his book
bag, he refused. It is known that the subject had a book bag with him
in the area of the murder. Mr. Miley was willing to bring a book bag
out of the house, but not to let me accompany him inside to look at the
bag.5
The affidavit also included the date of the alleged murder as May 20,
2000.6
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the affidavit failed to show
probable cause to allow the police to search Miley's home and reversed
the trial court's denial of Miley's motion to suppress.7 The court
determined that in the affidavit, the State had improperly relied on
Miley's refusal to provide written consent to enter his home and seize his
book bag; Miley's refusal could not contribute to a finding of probable
cause because it was a valid exercise of his constitutional rights.8 The
court also determined that the remaining bases for the warrant, that
Miley was seen with the victim on the date of her death and had a book
bag with him, while valid, were insufficient to provide probable cause
because they failed to detail how close to the time of the murder's
commission Miley had been seen with the victim, because they failed
to describe the circumstances under which Miley and the victim had
been seen together, and because an innocent person could have had a
book bag at the unspecified scene of the murder.9
Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings.'

°

4. Id. at 421, 614 S.E.2d at 744-45.
5. Id., 614 S.E.2d at 745 (alterations in original).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 422, 614 S.E.2d at 745.
8. Id. at 421-22, 614 S.E.2d at 745 (citing Gardner v. State, 255 Ga. App. 489, 493-94,
566 S.E.2d 329, 332 (2002); State v. Kwiatkowski, 238 Ga. App. 390, 393, 519 S.E.2d 43,
46 (1999)).
9. Id. at 422, 614 S.E.2d at 745.
10. Id.
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Direct Appeal Cases

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed three cases pursuant to the
automatic review procedure in Georgia's death penalty statute." None
of these cases present new issues of law due to their posture, but certain
portions are briefly mentioned to emphasize the court's reasoning which
may be helpful in future cases where claims have not been waived by
trial counsel or are adequately framed on appeal.
In Lewis v. State, 2 Gerald Patrick Lewis pleaded guilty in 2001 to
malice murder and was sentenced to death in 2003 following his
sentencing trial.1 3 On direct appeal, the court determined that there
was no error and upheld his death sentence.14
The court applied Greene v. State 5 to Lewis's claim that the trial
court erred in denying his motions to excuse certain prospective jurors
for cause due to their predisposition to the death penalty or bias against
a life sentence with or without the possibility of parole."6 The court
held that despite a leaning on the part of these prospective jurors for a
particular sentence, "none of them were irrevocably committed to voting
against one of the three possible sentences," and therefore, the trial
7
court did not abuse its discretion by finding them qualified to serve.
The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
excusing three prospective jurors for cause due to the jurors' inability to
consider a death sentence.'" First, the court observed that "[pirospective juror Atwater wavered with virtually all of her answers on the
death penalty" and that "[sihe was reluctant to answer questions about
the death penalty and did not think she could vote for a death sentence." 9 Atwater also stated that she would not consider evidence
supporting the death penalty.2" Second, the court determined that

11. See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35 (2004).
12. 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005).
13. Id. at 756-57, 620 S.E.2d at 781.
14. Id. at 757, 620 S.E.2d at 781.
15. 268 Ga. 47, 48, 485 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1997) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 424 (1985)) (noting that "[tihe proper standard for determining the disqualification of
a prospective juror based upon his views on capital punishment 'is whether the juror's
views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath."'"); see also Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646, 652,
501 S.E.2d 219, 227 (1998) (holding that a prospective juror cannot be excused for cause
solely because he or she is leaning for or against a death sentence).
16. Lewis, 279 Ga. at 760, 620 S.E.2d at 783.
17. Id. at 760-61, 620 S.E.2d at 784.
18. Id. at 761, 620 S.E.2d at 784.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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prospective juror Baulding "was opposed to the death penalty, would not
consider it as a possible sentence, and would not wait to hear if the
State had proved its case." 21
Finally, the court determined that
"[pirospective juror Bigby was morally opposed
to the death penalty and
22
would never vote for a death sentence."
In addition to denying a number of other claims,23 the court also held
that the State is not required to include in the indictment the statutory
aggravating circumstances it relies on to impose a death sentence.2 4
Further, the State is not required to prove nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.25 Accordingly, the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment.26
In Tollette v. State27 Leon Tollette pleaded guilty to malice murder
and felony murder and was sentenced to death.28 On direct appeal, the
court affirmed his sentence after noting that a number of Tollette's
claims were waived due to trial counsel's failure to object during the
trial proceedings.2 9
In one enumeration of error, Tollette claimed that the prosecutor made
improper references during his closing argument when he stated, "'[Tihe
just punishment under a lot of religions would be death for what
[Tollette did]."'30 The court agreed with Tollette and held that the
argument was improper.3 ' But the court also noted that trial counsel
failed to object to this argument at trial. 2 As a result, the error was
reviewed only to determine "whether it in reasonable probability led to

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 757-66, 620 S.E.2d at 781-88.
24. Id. at 763, 620 S.E.2d at 785-86 (citing Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 680, 604 S.E.2d
488, 493 (2004); Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 40-42, 572 S.E.2d 595, 602-03 (2002)). This
Author has observed that despite this holding, there has been a recent trend among many
prosecutors to charge the aggravating circumstances in the indictment.
25. Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 818, 525 S.E.2d 339, 347 (1999)).
26. Id. at 764-66, 620 S.E.2d at 786-88.
27. 280 Ga. 100, 621 S.E.2d 742 (2005).
28. Id. at 100-01, 621 S.E.2d at 745.
29. See id. at 103-08, 621 S.E.2d at 746-50.
30. Id. at 104, 621 S.E.2d at 748 (second alteration in original).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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the jury's selection of a death sentence."" The court held that the
argument did not and denied Tollette's claim. 4
The court also concluded that there was error in the prosecutor's
argument that referred to parole. 5 The prosecutor stated, "[Pirison is
too good for this defendant. Prison for the rest of his life, prison for
seven years and re-paroled, prison for whatever."" The court held that
"[t]he likelihood of parole is an improper subject matter for argument by
counsel," except in limited circumstances, which was inapplicable in the
case before the court.37 As a result, the court concluded that the trial
court erred in overruling Tollette's objection." However, the court held
that the error was harmless because the jury was charged that a
sentence of life without parole would make Tollette ineligible for
parole.3 9 The court rejected all of Tollette's other claims and affirmed
his sentence.4"
In Nance v. State,4 Michael Nance was convicted by a jury for malice
murder and was sentenced to death in 1997. In 2000 the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but reversed his death sentence
because a prospective juror was not properly qualified to serve on the
jury. Following Nance's second sentencing trial in 2002, a jury again
recommended a death sentence.42 On review, the court held that there
was no error and affirmed his sentence.4 3
The court held that the State is not required to prove nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt." The court also
held that the trial court did not err by failing to hold a second hearing

33. Id. (citing Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 713-14, 532 S.E.2d 677, 688 (2000)).
Whenever the death penalty has been imposed, the court is required to
consider whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. In doing so, [the court] consider[s]
whether any allegedly-improper arguments that were not objected to at trial in
reasonable probability "'changed the jury's exercise of discretion in choosing
between life imprisonment or death.'"
Gissendaner,272 Ga. at 713, 532 S.E.2d at 688 (quoting Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 730,
352 S.E.2d 762, 778 (1987)) (citation omitted).
34. Tollette, 280 Ga. at 104, 621 S.E.2d at 748.
35. Id. at 105, 621 S.E.2d at 748.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 101-08, 621 S.E.2d at 745-50.
41. 280 Ga. 125, 623 S.E.2d 470 (2005).
42. Id. at 125, 623 S.E.2d at 472.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 126, 623 SE.2d at 473.
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to determine whether extraordinary measures were required to prevent
dangerous and disruptive behavior on the part of Nance during trial.4"
In 1997 the trial court granted the State's request to require Nance to
wear a stun belt in court during the trial of the case after holding a
hearing in which evidence was presented that Nance "had threatened to
'bite the nose off' the prosecuting attorney during the trial."" The
court held that despite the passage of several years, it was not an abuse
of the trial court's discretion to rely on its prior holding, and thus, the
trial court was not required to conduct a new hearing on the issue in
2002. 47
Applying the standard from Greene,45 the court denied Nance's claim
that five prospective jurors were erroneously qualified to serve and held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying them.4 9
First, Nance claimed that prospective juror Kenerly was not qualified to
serve (1) because Kenerly's mother had been murdered in 1979, (2)
because he "regularly banked at the bank branch robbed by Nance," and
(3) because he said that he "could not consider parole for someone
convicted of murder and other crimes. " " The court held that despite
these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying
prospective juror Kenerly because he later said that he could vote for all
three possible sentences.5 1
Second, Nance claimed that prospective juror Barrett was erroneously
qualified because Barrett was opposed to a sentence of life with the
possibility of parole for someone convicted of malice murder.5 2 During
voir dire, Barrett stated that he could vote for all three possible
sentences for someone convicted of malice murder, but in response to a
question from Nance's counsel, he stated that he could not vote for life
with the possibility of parole. However, Barrett later equivocated and
stated that he could consider sentencing someone convicted of malice
murder to life with the possibility of parole.5 3 As a result, the court
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by qualifying
Barrett because the totality of the circumstances indicated that he could
vote for all three possible sentences.5 4

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 126-27, 623 S.E.2d at 473.
Id. at 127, 623 S.E.2d at 473.
Id.
268 Ga. at 48, 485 S.E.2d at 743.
Nance, 280 Ga. at 128-30, 623 S.E.2d at 474-76.
Id. at 128, 623 S.E.2d at 474.
Id.
Id. at 129, 623 S.E.2d at 474.
Id., 623 S.E.2d at 475.
Id., 623 S.E.2d at 474-75.
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Third, the court rejected Nance's claim that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding that prospective juror Eberhardt was qualified to
serve. 5 Eberhardt, who stated that "he believed in an eye for an eye,"
also stated that not everyone convicted of murder should receive the
death sentence.5" But in response to questioning from Nance's counsel,
Eberhardt consistently maintained that he could consider sentencing
Nance to life with the possibility of parole.57 As a result, the court
concluded that based on the totality of Eberhardt's responses, the trial
court 5did not abuse its discretion by finding that he was qualified to
serve. 8
Fourth, Nance claimed that prospective juror Syall was erroneously
qualified to serve.59 Syall stated that "'if you cause death, death should
come to you. You reap what you sow."' 6 ° Syall went on to indicate that
"she did not believe someone convicted of a violent crime could be
rehabilitated, and believed a convicted murderer should never be
considered for parole."6 Finally, she stated, "My belief is that if you
killed someone, you should get death."62 Nonetheless, Syall repeatedly
stated that she could consider all three possible sentences for a convicted
murderer. 3 Despite Syall's apparent inconsistent positions, the court
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Syall
was qualified to serve because Syall had consistently maintained that
she could consider all three possible sentences.64
Fifth, Nance claimed that prospective juror Burke was erroneously
qualified to serve because Burke stated that he did not think "those
convicted of 'intentional and deliberate' malice murder should ever be
considered for parole."65 However, Burke also repeatedly stated that
he could fairly consider and vote for all three possible sentencing options
in Nance's case.66 Accordingly, the court rejected Nance's claim and
held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that
Burke was qualified to serve.67

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id., 623 S.E.2d at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 129-30, 623 S.E.2d at 475.
Id. at 129, 623 S.E.2d at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130, 623 S.E.2d at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id., 623 S.E.2d at 476.
Id.
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The court denied all of Nance's remaining claims but one, which was
vacated due to a technicality,"' and affirmed the remainder of his
sentence.6 s
C.

State Postconviction Cases
In Schofield v. Gulley,7° William Marvin Gulley was convicted of
malice murder and was sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed his convictions and sentences in 1999. In 2000 Gulley filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 2004 the habeas court vacated his
death sentence and held that Gulley's trial attorneys rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel.7 1 The warden appealed, claiming that the habeas
court erroneously held that "Gulley's trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in the sentencing phase."7 2 Gulley cross-appealed, arguing
that the habeas court erred "by not finding his trial attorneys ineffective
in the sentencing phase in several other respects."7 3 The court affirmed
74
the habeas court's judgments in both the appeal and cross-appeal.
At trial, Gulley was represented by two sets of trial attorneys.7 ' The
habeas court determined that the second set of attorneys rendered
ineffective assistance in the sentencing phase because the attorneys
failed to adequately investigate the fact that Gulley had saved the lives
of two people in August 1992.6 The record revealed that Gulley's first
attorneys had received a defense investigator's memorandum which
stated that Gulley claimed he had saved the lives of three people.77
Gulley's new attorneys were also made aware of the incidents from an
article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution,which reported that Bill
Gulley "saved the lives of two persons in three days."8 On September
3, 1997, lead trial counsel transmitted a facsimile to a defense investiga-

68. Id. at 131, 623 S.E.2d at 476 (holding that Nance's felony murder conviction was
vacated by operation of law during his first appeal because the victim was the same for
Nance's malice murder and felony murder convictions, and therefore, it should not have
been submitted to the jury on remand).
69. Id. at 130-32, 623 S.E.2d at 476-77.
70. 279 Ga. 413, 614 S.E.2d 740 (2005).
71. Id. at 413, 614 S.E.2d at 740.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 414, 614 S.E.2d at 741. Gulley was originally represented by Billy C. Mathis,
Jr. and Craig S. Mathis. In February 1996 these attorneys withdrew from the case. In
April 1996 they were replaced by Thomas G. Ledford, John L. Tracy, III, and Mark T.
Phillips. Ledford served as lead counsel. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id., 614 S.E.2d at 741-42.
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tor, requesting that the defense investigator pursue the claim and work
with the lead trial counsel's own investigator to find out more information about the incidents.79
Co-counsel, the attorney assigned to prepare the case in mitigation,
testified in the habeas court that the two investigators "did not succeed
in locating the two persons whom Gulley reportedly saved" but admitted
that he did not "know if they tried."8 ° Co-counsel also testified that the
attorneys gave very little direction to the investigators and that
information sharing amongst the attorneys was "'very disorganized"' and
"'no better than gossip."'81 Testimony from lead counsel and a third
attorney appointed to the case revealed that they were focused on issues
of guilt and innocence and provided no information regarding the
investigation of the incidents.8 2
Lead counsel admitted that he
originally believed a death sentence was unlikely but later realized after
Gulley was charged with an additional capital crime that "'we had not
prepared for mitigation and that we had no time to do it.'"8 "
The court determined that habeas counsel pursued "several fairly
obvious avenues of investigation" which trial counsel had failed to look
into and which "proved fruitful."84 Habeas counsel interviewed one of
Gulley's half-brothers, Waldell Thomas, who knew about the incidents.85 The court determined that there "is not anything in the record
to suggest that the failure of Gulley's trial attorneys to interview his
half-brother resulted from anything other than neglect."8
Habeas counsel also obtained an affidavit from Dan O'Connor, who
stated that "he had worked at the Ritz-Carlton hotel, that Gulley saved
him when he was accidentally electrocuted at work, and that he was
aware that his brother assisted Gulley in saving a woman at Grady
Hospital who attempted to jump out a window."87 Habeas counsel also
obtained testimony from Dan O'Connor's brother, Richard O'Connor, who
said he had "assisted Gulley in saving a woman from throwing herself
out of a window." 8

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id., 614 S.E.2d at 742.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 415, 614 S.E.2d at 742.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Additionally, habeas counsel procured a Grady Hospital record of
Gulley's treatment, which was mentioned in the news article.8 9 The
article reported that "the 'Bill Gulley' who saved two lives was 'cut
slightly' at the hospital while struggling with the woman attempting
suicide."9 ° The court determined that this news report would have "led
reasonable counsel to inquire of the hospital, or at least Gulley himself,
whether he received treatment."91
Accordingly, the court held, "Whatever our own opinions may be about
the sentencing verdict in this case, the habeas court correctly determined
that there is a reasonable probability that evidence of Gulley's having
saved two persons' lives, at risk to his own life, would have changed that
sentencing verdict."92 After concluding that Gulley's claims on crossappeal were either without merit, barred
by procedural default, or moot,
93
the court vacated his death sentence.
9 4 Palmer
In Schofield v. Palmer,
was sentenced to death after he was
convicted in 1995 of murdering his estranged wife and stepdaughter.9 5
On direct appeal, the court affirmed his convictions and sentence, and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.96 In 2000 Palmer
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and an evidentiary hearing was
held in 2003."7 The habeas court granted Palmer relief in 2005 and
vacated his convictions because the State withheld exculpatory evidence
prior to trial.98 The habeas court also concluded that Palmer's trial
counsel was ineffective.99 The Warden appealed the habeas court's
decisions, and Palmer appealed the habeas court's denial of his
remaining claims.'0 ° The
court affirmed the habeas court's ruling on
1 2
the Brady'' violation.

Prior to trial, Palmer's attorneys filed a motion seeking "information
possessed by the State about any deals or agreements between the State

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416, 614 S.E.2d at 743.
Id. at 416-17, 614 S.E.2d at 743-44.
279 Ga. 848, 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005).
Id. at 848, 621 S.E.2d at 728.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 849, 621 S.E.2d at 728.
Id.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Schofield, 279 Ga. at 849, 621 S.E.2d at 728.
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and any witness." 10 3 At the pretrial motions hearing, the State
advised the court that it had complied with the motion "by informing the
defense about [the co-defendant's] plea bargain" and that compliance
0 4
would be ongoing."
At the conclusion of Palmer's trial and appeal, habeas counsel
attempted to obtain information about a confidential informant who was
working for the Georgia Bureau of Investigation ("G.B.I.") and who had
been involved in Palmer's case.'0 5 The G.B.I. and other state agencies
prevented habeas counsel from obtaining the file, which was separate
from the district attorney's file, "claiming that the identity of a
confidential informant ("CI") must be kept secret" in order to protect the
identity of the C. °6 This was in spite of the fact that the district
attorney, in his opening statement at trial, told the jury the CI was
Randy Waltower.' °7 The G.B.I. prevented Palmer from gaining access
to the CI file throughout the years of habeas corpus discovery.'08
Palmer was also unable to obtain the record pursuant to the Open
Records Act. 0 9 However, when the habeas court conducted an in
camera review of the file, the court learned that "one week after the
murders and about five days after Palmer's arrest, the G.B.I. paid
Waltower $500 for providing information implicating Palmer as the
The State never revealed this information to the
murderer.""0
defense.'
The court held that Palmer's claim was not procedurally barred even
though it was not raised on direct appeal because Palmer met the causeand-prejudice exception under Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.") section 9-14-48(d). 112 The court stated that in order "to

103. Id. at 850, 621 S.E.2d at 729 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1972); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 851, 621 S.E.2d at 730.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) (2006)). Under O.C.G.A. section 9-14-48(d):
The court shall review the trial record and transcript of proceedings and consider
whether the petitioner made timely motion or objection or otherwise complied with
Georgia procedural rules at trial and on appeal and whether, in the event the
petitioner had new counsel subsequent to trial, the petitioner raised any claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal; and absent a showing of cause for
noncompliance with such requirement, and of actual prejudice, habeas corpus
relief shall not be granted. In all cases habeas corpus relief shall be granted to

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

show cause, a petitioner may demonstrate that 'some objective factor
external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim that
has been procedurally defaulted."113
Palmer demonstrated cause
because he could not have brought the claim earlier
due to the State's
11 4
concealment of the evidence underlying the claim.
As to the prejudice prong, because his "underlying claim [was] a
constitutional claim involving the denial of his due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the underlying claim and the prejudice
analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test [were] coextensive."" The court noted that "'suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable tQ an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'"1 1 6 The
court concluded that "[blecause the reliability of a particular witness
may be determinative of guilt or innocence, impeachment evidence,
including evidence about any deals or agreements between the State and
the witness, falls within the Brady rule."" 7
Applying the Brady standards to the facts of the case before it, the
court determined that Palmer met the first three Brady elements
because "[t]he State possessed the information about its payment of a
witness against Palmer, never informed Palmer about the payment, and
for years fought any attempt by Palmer to find out about it."1 1 8 The
court went on to state that the most important element of Palmer's
Brady claim was materiality: "[W]hether, if the State had complied with
its due process obligations and informed Palmer about the witness
payment before trial, there is a 'reasonable probability of a different
result.""1 9 The court emphasized that Palmer did not have to demonstrate "that he would have been acquitted if he had been able to impeach

avoid a miscarriage of justice. If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall
enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence challenged
in the proceeding and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial,
custody, or discharge as may be necessary and proper.
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d).
113. Schofield, 279 Ga. at 851, 621 S.E.2d at 730 (citing Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820,
825, 493 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1997)) (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004)) (citation omitted).
116. Id. (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
117. Id. at 852, 621 S.E.2d at 730.
118. Id., 621 S.E.2d at 731.
119. Id. (quoting Banks, 540 U.S. at 699).
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Waltower," only that the State's suppression
of evidence "'undermine[d]
' 120
confidence in the outcome of the trial.
The court stated that the habeas court determined that "the suppressed evidence was material because it deprived Palmer from
impeaching Waltower" about the effect of the pecuniary gain on his
testimony.121 The court also noted the habeas court's conclusion that
the State must have believed that the information Waltower had was
valuable. 22' The habeas court came to this conclusion based on the
fact that the State paid $500 for the information.1 23 Furthermore, "the
State must have also believed that knowledge of the payment would
have affected its case against Palmer because it went to such great
lengths to conceal it." 24 Accordingly, the court affirmed the habeas
court's ruling on the Brady error and vacated
Palmer's convictions.' 25
126
The case was remanded for a new trial.
In Terry v. Jenkins,'127 Larry Jenkins was convicted of malice murder
and sentenced to death in 1995. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
his sentence on direct appeal, 12' and Jenkins filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in 1999.129 After the habeas court conducted evidentiary hearings, the court vacated Jenkins's death sentences and
convictions because Jenkins was under the age of eighteen when he
committed the crime for which he was sentenced to death, and because
Jenkins received ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilt-innocence
phase of his trial.' 30
The court noted the habeas court's finding of fact that Jenkins was
seventeen years old at the time of the crime, and therefore, pursuant to
Roper v. Simmons,' 3' was ineligible for the death penalty.'32 The
court also agreed with the habeas court that trial counsel was ineffective

120. Id. at 852-53, 621 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995)).
121. Id. at 853, 621 S.E.2d at 731.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The court also rejected Palmer's claim on cross-appeal that the habeas court
had incorrectly denied his claim that he is mentally retarded. Id. The court stated that
Palmer could raise the mental retardation issue on retrial if he chose to do so. Id.
126. Id.
127. 280 Ga. 341, 627 S.E.2d 7 (2006).
128. See Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 498 S.E.2d 502 (1998).
129. Terry, 280 Ga. at 341, 627 S.E.2d at 8.
130. Id.
131. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
132. Terry, 280 Ga. at 341, 627 S.E.2d at 8.
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during
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial and affirmed its hold1
ing.

33

The record revealed that a local attorney was originally appointed to
represent Jenkins, but because the attorney lacked experience in capital
cases, the trial court appointed a more experienced attorney to serve as
lead counsel, with the original attorney remaining on the case as cocounsel.13 4 The habeas court determined that there was "'miscommunicat[ion] about the role each [attorney] would play in [Jenkins's]
defense. ' 135 Lead counsel testified in a deposition that co-counsel was
responsible for "'investigat[ing] all of the witnesses and events in
Jesup. '" 1 6 Despite the lead counsel's testimony, co-counsel saw 'his
1 37
position as providing "'local flavor"' and "'doing what [he] was told.
Co-counsel also testified that despite being appointed to the case, "he
was not going to 'fan the flames,"' which meant he would not be "'front
and center.' " 31 Co-counsel stated, "'I just was not going to be front
and center on it .... If witnesses were brought to me, I'd talk to them.

I was not personally going to run down every rumor I heard."" 9
During the habeas hearing, lead counsel admitted that "it was not
until trial that he discovered that 'very, very little had been done' to
prepare mitigating evidence."' 4° Despite lead counsel's reliance on the
theory that another person, Michael Woods, committed the crimes, lead
counsel "lacked evidence to support that theory."4 4 Furthermore, the
only investigation focusing on that theory "consisted of a short interview
by [co-counsel], who stated that he obtained no useful information and
abandoned any further inquiry" after learning that Woods had an alibi
and was rumored to have taken and passed a polygraph test.4 4 The
habeas court determined that co-counsel "failed to perform even the most
rudimentary investigation and that [his] investigation into Woods's
involvement in the crimes was so deficient that it actually 'impeded the
investigation of [Jenkins's] case.'' 4
Additionally, lead counsel "testified that six days before trial Jenkins
told him that on the night of the murders he was with Woods, who

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 344, 627 S.E.2d at 10.
(third alteration in original).

(omission in original).

at 344-45, 627 S.E.2d at 10.
at 345, 627 S.E.2d at 10 (second alteration in original).
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prevented him from leaving, and that Woods and [another person,
Bernies] Durden[,] committed the crimes and then threatened to harm
Jenkins's family if he spoke up."144 Lead counsel admitted "that they
did nothing to investigate Woods's involvement because of the impending
trial."14 Furthermore, the record revealed no evidence
that counsel
14 6
attempted to get a continuance to investigate the claim.
The court ruled that "[had defense counsel investigated its own
primary defense, they would have discovered that both [of Woods's alibi
witnesses] denied that Woods was with them on the night of the
murders .
,,"47 The court noted that "[habeas counsel ... presented
four witnesses whose testimony demonstrated Woods's possession and
control of the
van and that Woods told one such witness that the van
14 8
was his."
The court also determined that numerous other witnesses who were
known to trial counsel or easily discoverable by trial counsel, and whose49
testimony would have been helpful to Jenkins, were not contacted.
The court stated:
[W]here trial counsel failed to do so, habeas counsel obtained testimony
from numerous witnesses tending to establish that Woods lied to police
about his whereabouts on the night of the crimes, that he was driving
the victims' white van shortly after the murders and [was in possession
of evidence that was likely from the crime scene], that Durden was
riding with Woods wearing clothing stained with something that looked
like blood, and that both Woods and Durden were acting strangely on
the night of the murders. 50
The court determined that the record and transcripts of the appeal
supported the habeas court's determinations, which described "the
careless and unreasonable manner in which defense preparations were
undertaken." 51 Citing Wiggins v. Smith,'52 the court "agree[d] with
the habeas court's conclusion that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to investigate the factual defense to the crime and
failing to obtain available testimony confirming that defense and their

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id., 627 S.E.2d at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 346, 627 S.E.2d at 11.
Id.
Id. at 347, 627 S.E.2d at 12.
539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003).
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The court further stated that

Jenkins was prejudiced by trial counsel's unreasonable performance
because there was a "'reasonable probability'" that the outcome would
have been different had trial counsel performed adequately."4 Accordingly, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the habeas court's ruling that
Jenkins's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the guiltinnocence phase of the trial. 5

II.

DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

The following two cases of the United States Supreme Court have been
included in this Article because they touch on important issues directly
applicable to Georgia cases. In the first, the Court announces its
inclination to reject Eighth Amendment residual-doubt claims in the
future.'56 In the second, the Court refines the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard and counsel's obligation to investigate mitigating
evidence during the penalty-phase of a capital murder trial.157
In Oregon v. Guzek,"5 ' Guzek was charged with capital murder and,
during his trial, presented an alibi defense which included testimony
from his grandfather and mother. Rejecting his alibi defense, a jury
found him guilty and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Oregon
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction but ordered a new sentencing
proceeding. After being sentenced to death a second time, Guzek
appealed and his death sentence was reversed again. At his third
sentencing proceeding, Guzek received yet another death sentence.
Guzek appealed for the third time, and the Oregon Supreme Court again
held that there were errors in his sentencing proceeding and granted
him a new sentencing trial. In an effort to avoid further errors at the
new proceeding, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether Guzek would be permitted to introduce live alibi testimony at
the new sentencing trial. The court held that the Eighth 59 and
Fourteenth Amendments 61 of the United States Constitution gave
Guzek the right to introduce this evidence in his new sentencing

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Terry, 280 Ga. at 347, 627 S.E.2d at 12.
Id. (quoting Schofield, 279 Ga. at 416, 614 S.E.2d at 743).
Id.
Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226, 1232-34 (2006).
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-93 (2005).
126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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proceeding. 6 ' The 16United
States Supreme Court granted the State's
2
request for review.
After dismissing Guzek's jurisdictional argument,'
the Court
addressed the merits of the State's claim and held that nothing in the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments provides a capital defendant the
right to introduce at a sentencing proceeding new evidence that is
"inconsistent"with his conviction and "sheds no light on the manner in
which he committed the crime for which he has been convicted."'6
Guzek had sought to introduce new evidence at the sentencing trial,
specifically, additional live testimony from his mother that would show
he was not present at the crime scene.16 According to the Court, "'the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer ... not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death. ' 166 The Court determined that the type of evidence that Guzek
attempted to introduce was beyond the scope of constitutionally relevant
mitigating evidence. 16' The Court noted that in two prior cases relied
on by Guzek, "the evidence at issue ... was traditional sentence-related
evidence, evidence that tended to show how, not whether, the defendant
committed the crime."168 The Court held:
[Tihe Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State of its authority to
set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and
to control the manner in which it is submitted .... "States are free to
structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence 'in an effort
to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death
penalty.'"169
While the Court never reached the issue in this case, it noted in dicta
that "the Oregon Supreme Court erred in interpreting Green [v.
Georgia] ° as providing a capital defendant with a constitutional right

161. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. at 1229.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1230-31.
165. Id. at 1230.
166. Id. at 1231 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (omission in
original).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1232 (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990)).
170. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
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to introduce residual doubt evidence at sentencing.""' This language,
along with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, 172 indicates the Court's
inclination
to reject Eighth Amendment residual-doubt claims in the
3
1

future.

In Rompilla v. Beard,1 74 a jury found Ronald Rompilla guilty of
murdering James Scanlon."15 During the penalty phase, "the prosecutor sought to prove three aggravating factors to justify a death sentence:
that the murder was committed in the course of another felony; that the
murder was committed by torture; and that Rompilla had a significant
176
history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence."
Rompilla's case in mitigation was comprised of brief testimony by family
members, including his fourteen-year-old son, who argued for residual
doubt and asked the jury for mercy. The jury acknowledged this
evidence and found as two mitigating factors (1) the fact that his son
testified and (2) that it was possible for Rompilla to be rehabilitated.
However, the jury still found that the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating factors and sentenced Rompilla to death.'77
Rompilla requested postconviction relief on several claims, including
ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon trial counsel's failure
to present significant mitigating evidence about Rompilla's childhood,
mental capacity, health, and alcoholism. Postconviction relief was
denied, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial of
relief. Rompilla then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.17 The district court held that the lower
court had unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington..9 during the
penalty phase of the trial, and therefore, the court granted relief for
ineffective assistance of counsel. 8 ° A divided Third Circuit panel
reversed, determining that there was "nothing unreasonable in the state
court's application of Strickland."'' The panel also distinguished
Wiggins v. Smith,' holding that the investigation in Rompilla's case

171. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. at 1232.
172. Id. at 1233-34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 1234 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
175. Id. at 378.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378-79.
179. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
180. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 379.
181. Id.
182. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).

20061

DEATH PENALTY

129

went "far enough to leave counsel with reason for thinking further
efforts would not be a wise use of the limited resources they had."8l 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2004184 and
reversed on the sole issue of ineffective assistance of counsel' s' without
reaching Rompilla's second claim under Simmons v. South Carolina. 8s
The Court recognized that "[tihis is not a case in which defense counsel
simply ignored their obligation to find mitigating evidence.1 87 The
Court pointed out that despite being busy public defenders, trial counsel
made a number of efforts to obtain mitigating evidence, including
interviewing family members and hiring mental health experts. 88
Nonetheless, the Court concluded it was dispositive that counsel had
failed to examine a court file regarding Rompilla's prior conviction for
rape and assault.'8 9 The Court stated that counsel's failure to examine
this prior conviction file "fell below the level of reasonable performance"
for two reasons: (1) because counsel knew the State intended to seek the
death penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant history of felony
convictions, an aggravator under state law and (2) because counsel knew
the State would try to prove this history by using his prior conviction for
rape and assault and would highlight his violent character by introducing a transcript of the victim's testimony from the rape and assault
trial. 190
The Court determined that the defense counsel was on notice of the
prosecution's plans because one of the defense attorneys had acknowledged the prosecution's strategy in a plea letter written prior to
trial.' 91 Despite this awareness, the Court determined that defense
counsel had not looked at any part of the file, including the transcript
of the victim's testimony.9 2 The Court observed that counsel "seriously compromise[d] their opportunity to respond to [the State's] case for
aggravation" and that counsel "had a duty to make all reasonable efforts
to learn what they could about the offense."'93 Counsel's obligation
was particularly important due to the "similarity of the violent prior

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 379.
542 U.S. 966, 966 (2004).
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380 n.1.
Id.; Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Id.
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 385.
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offense to the crime charged and Rompilla's sentencing strategy
stressing residual doubt." 94
Furthermore, counsel's obligation to "obtain information that the State
has and will use against the defendant," in addition to being "a matter
of common sense," was made explicit by the American Bar Association
("A.B.A.") Standards for Criminal Justice ("the Standards") that existed
at the time of Rompilla's trial.1 95 Observing that it has long relied on
the Standards as a guide to determine what is reasonable, the Court
stated that the Standards at the time of Rompilla's trial provided that
counsel has a duty "'to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant6
to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.' "19
The Court further stated that A.B.A. Guidelines relating to the death
penalty provide that defense "'[c]ounsel must ... investigate prior
convictions ... that could be used as aggravating circumstances or
otherwise come into evidence.... Counsel may also find extenuating
that can be offered to lessen the weight of a conviccircumstances
97
tion.'"1
Addressing the postconviction court's decision, the Court stated, "It
flouts prudence to deny that a defense lawyer should try to look at a file
he knows the prosecution will cull for aggravating evidence, let alone
198
when the file is sitting in the trial courthouse, open for the asking."
The Court concluded, "No reasonable lawyer would forgo examination of
the file thinking he could do as well by asking the defendant or family
relations whether they recalled anything helpful or damaging in the
prior victim's testimony."199
The Court also held that counsel's lapse was prejudicial because the
file on the prior conviction held a number of mitigation leads unavailable
from any other source.2"' The file itself contained records of Rompilla's
imprisonment on an earlier conviction, including extensive information
Consequently, this
about Rompilla's childhood and background. 2"'
information would have provided counsel with leads to develop an

194. Id. at 386.
195. Id. at 387.
196. Id. (quoting 1 A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)).
197. Id. (quoting A.B.A. Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases § 10.7 comment (rev. ed. 2003)) (first and second omissions
in original).
198. Id. at 389.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 390.
201. Id. at 390-91.
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extensive case in mitigation, as was done by postconviction counsel. °2
The Court determined that "[t]he accumulated entries would have
destroyed the benign conception of Rompilla's upbringing and mental
capacity defense counsel had formed.""' The Court stated that "the
undiscovered 'mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, "might well have
influenced the jury's appraisal" of [Rompilla's] culpability.'' 2 4 Accordingly, the Court reversed Rompilla's death sentence because "the
likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone in [was]
'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' actually reached at
sentencing."" 5

202.

Id. The evidence presented by postconviction counsel was summarized by Judge

Sloviter:
"Rompilla's parents were both severe alcoholics who drank constantly. His mother
drank during her pregnancy with Rompilla, and he and his brothers eventually
developed serious drinking problems. His father, who had a vicious temper,
frequently beat Rompilla's mother, leaving her bruised and black-eyed, and
bragged about his cheating on her. His parents fought violently, and on at least
one occasion his mother stabbed his father. He was abused by his father who beat
him when he was young with his hands, fists, leather straps, belts and sticks. All
of the children lived in terror. There were no expressions of parental love,
affection or approval. Instead, he was subjected to yelling and verbal abuse. His
father locked Rompilla and his brother Richard in a small wire mesh dog pen that
was filthy and excrement filled. He had an isolated background, and was not
allowed to visit other children or to speak to anyone on the phone. They had no
indoor plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with no heat, and the children
were not given clothes and attended school in rags."
Id. at 391-92.
203. Id. at 391.
204. Id. at 393 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 538).
205. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

